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Getting Told
and Being Believed
Richard Moran
Recent interest in the epistemology of testimony has focused
attention on what justification we may commonly have in
the vast areas of life where we are dependent on what other
people tell us.  This dependence is not restricted to what we
are told in face-to-face encounters, for we also take ourselves
to know all sorts of things that only reached us through a
long chain of utterances and documents, whose evidential
status we have never investigated for ourselves and will
never be in a position to investigate.   And the content of
such knowledge is not confined to the arcana of specialized
studies but includes such mundane matters as the facts of
one’s own birth and parentage, the geographical and insti-
tutional facts of one’s immediate environment, and the gen-
eral facts that make up one’s basic sense of what the world is
like.
In part it is the enormity of this dependence that makes
for the interest in the subject of testimony, combined with
the apparent clash between the kind of epistemic relations
involved here and the classic empiricist picture of genuine
knowledge basing itself either on direct experience of the
facts or on working out conclusions for oneself.
1  It isn’t just
that the bulk of what we take ourselves to know is so highly
mediated, as even knowledge gained through a microscope or
other scientific instrument must be; rather it is that the vehi-
cle of mediation here—what other people say—seems so
flimsy, unregulated, and is known in plenty of cases to be
unreliable, even deliberately so.   People do lie, get things
wrong, and speak carelessly.  And while we may realistically
1 Cf. Locke: “For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other
Men’s Eyes, as to know by other Men’s Understandings.  So much as we our-
selves consider and comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of
real and true Knowledge.  The floating of other Men’s Opinions in our brains
makes us not a jot more knowing, though they happen to be true” (Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding, 1, 4, 23).
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hope for continued improvement in the various technical
means of epistemic mediation (advances in scientific instru-
mentation are part of the history of scientific progress, after
all), there is little reason to expect that the fallibility and
mendacity associated with human testimony will one day be
overcome.  So in this light, reflecting on just how much we
rely on the word of others, we may conclude that either we
are very careless believers indeed, with no right to claim to
know more than a fraction of what we think we know, or
some great reductionist program must be in the offing, trac-
ing this chain back to something resembling the classic pic-
ture of knowledge by acquaintance.
2
Hume’s famous discussion of the believability of reports
of miracles is the locus classicus for attempts to understand
the epistemic status of testimony as ultimately the same as
that of any other reliable evidence.
3    And part of what is
meant by this claim is that the basis we may have in any
given case for believing what we hear can only be an a poste-
riori judgement to the effect that in this case there is a reli-
able evidential correlation between the statement we are
being offered and the facts themselves.  Several recent writ-
ers, most notably C. A. J. Coady in his book Testimony,
4 have
argued that the Humean picture cannot succeed in riecon-
structing our actual basis for believing what people say, and
that our entitlement to believe what we are told must have,
in part, an a priori basis.  Somewhat lost in much recent dis-
cussion, however, is attention to the basic relationship be-
tween people when one person tells a second person some-
thing and the second person believes him.  This is the pri-
mary everyday occurrence, and it is the basic way knowl-
2 Or back to observation sentences.  Cf. Quine and Ullian (1970), pp. 33-35,
which  makes  explicit  comparison  of  testimony  with  the  “extension  of  the
senses” provided by telescopes and radar.
3 On Miracles’, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
4 Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford, 1992).
edge gets around.   Or at least, so we say.   For normally
(though not without exception) we take it to be sufficient for
someone’s being brought to know that P that they were told
by someone who knew, and they believed him.  And now, of
course, if this person is taken to know that P, he may tell an-
other person, and so on.   This may seem absurdly simple
and unreflective, and to be at odds with an earlier picture of
genuine knowledge as being more of an achievement lying at
the end of an arduous path from belief or opinion.  My con-
cern in this paper, however, is not so much with the condi-
tions for knowledge as with the nature of the two sides of
the relationship described here.  One person tells the other
person something, and this other person believes him.  I want
to understand what ‘telling’ is, especially as this contrasts
with other things done in (assertoric) speech such as per-
suading, arguing, or demonstrating; activities which may
also lead to belief or knowledge for the interlocutor, but in
importantly different ways.  And primarily I want to exam-
ine the relation of believing where its direct object is not a
proposition but a person.   For in the basic case described
above, it is the speaker who is believed, and belief in the
proposition asserted follows from this.  These are different
epistemic phenomena.  For the hearer might not believe the
speaker at all, taking him for a con man, but yet believe that
what he has said is in fact true.  Whereas when the hearer
believes the speaker, he not only believes what is said but
does so on the basis of taking the speaker’s word for it.   I
don’t mean to suggest that this distinction has been wholly
ignored in the literature of testimony, and I will soon come
to discuss what I think is the best recent discussion of it.  But
both it and the distinction between the speech-act of telling
and other things done with assertion have not been given a
central place in the discussion of what is distinctive about
the epistemic dependence on testimony.  Specifically, I wish3
Richard Moran Getting Told and Being Believed
to argue that any account of testimony that seeks to resist the
(Humean) assimilation of its epistemic status to that of an
evidence-like correlation between one set of phenomena and
another will have to give a central place to the distinctive
relation of believing another person.
5  Only in this way can
we account for what is distinctive about acquiring beliefs
from what people say, as opposed to learning from other ex-
pressive or revealing behavior of theirs.  The hope is to show
that the paradigmatic situations of telling cannot be thought
of as the presentation or acceptance of evidence at all, and
that this is connected with the specifically linguistic nature of
the transfer of knowledge through testimony (which will
take us through an epistemological reading of Grice’s origi-
nal account of non-natural meaning).
Evidential Relations and the A Priori
It is in part due to the epistemological context of recent dis-
cussion  of  testimony  that  argument  has  focused  on  the
question of the a priori or a posteriori status of our justification
for beliefs acquired in this way.  In recent work, both C.A.J
Coady  and  Tyler  Burge  have  argued  against  a  broadly
Humean picture, by attacking the idea that we could only
have a posteriori justification for believing what others tell
us.
6   Coady presents more than one argument against the
Humean idea, but several of them begin with the following
strategy.  If we can only have a posteriori grounds for taking
what people say to be a reliable guide to the facts, then on
such a view it must be conceivable for there to be a commu-
nity of speakers whose assertions bore no reliable relation to
the facts.  If we are to be in a position to deploy an a posteriori
argument for the existence of such a correlation, it must be
5 I follow other recent writers in characterizing this as a Humean position,
but I don’t argue for the attribution.   For a dissenting view, see Saul Traiger
(1993).
6 Coady, op. cit., and Tyler Burge (1993).
possible for us to begin confronting the linguistic evidence
without begging that very question.  Coady presents a pow-
erful and connected set of arguments for the conclusion that
this is not, in fact, a coherent possibility.  Not only would the
practice within the community of making or accepting as-
sertions soon break down on such assumptions, but from a
perspective outside the community there are deeper reasons
connected with the interpretation of speech which prevent
the Humean scenario from being realizable.  For assigning
content to the utterances of the hypothetical speakers re-
quires, for familiar reasons, regular correlation between as-
sertive  utterances  and  the  conditions  under  which  they
would be true.  Massive disparity between the content we
assign to utterances and their truth or rationality would
oblige us as interpreters to revise our original assignments of
content to them.  So there is, in fact, no genuine possibility of
a community of speakers whose assertions failed, as a gen-
eral rule, to correlate with the facts.  And thus, contrary to
the Humean picture, our general justification for believing
what people say cannot be a purely empirical, a posteriori
one.
7  
Both arguments direct themselves against the idea that
we have, at best, empirical, inductive grounds for believing
what people say.   I don’t dispute this general point or the
7 Burge’s argument is very different, and I will not be examining its details
here.  In particular, unlike Coady as we will see, his account does not appeal to a
principle of charity in the situation of radical interpretation.  What it shares with
Coady’s argument is the aim of providing some a priori warrant for believing
what is said.   Burge argues for what he calls the Acceptance Principle, which
states that “A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as
true and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so”
(467).  He states that this is “not an empirical principle” (469).  And the general
form of justification associated with it is meant to apply equally to our epistemic
dependence on other people (“rational sources”) and to our dependence on cer-
tain capacities, what he calls “resources for reason”, such as memory and per-
ception (469-70).  By contrast, for my purposes the difference between our de-
pendence on memory and perception and our dependence on other people is all-
important for the understanding of testimony.4
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particular way it is argued for in these two instances, but I
do want to point out that this general form of argument de-
scribes no particular role for the notions either of a speaker’s
telling someone something or of believing that speaker.  What
the generality of such arguments provides is a defeasible a
priori warrant for believing that what other people say will
normally be true.  But any argument pitched at that level of
generality will leave untouched the question of whether be-
lieving the person (as opposed to believing the truth of what
is said) is a legitimate, and perhaps basic, source of new be-
liefs.  For we might well have an a priori defeasible warrant
for accepting the beliefs we gain through observing the be-
havior of others (verbal and otherwise) without this war-
rant’s involving the concepts of ‘saying’ or ‘telling’ at all.  By
itself, such a justification is no different from the presump-
tive right we may have (ceteris paribus) to rely on the deliver-
ances of the senses or of memory.  At this level of argument,
the speech of other people could still be something which is
treated as evidence for the truth of various claims about the
world; the difference would only be that here we may have
some non-empirical right to treat this phenomenon as evi-
dence, perhaps even very good evidence.
8  This general line
of thought begins, then, to look more like a non-skeptical
version of the basic Humean view, and less like a vindication
of testimony as a distinct source of beliefs, one not reducible
to a form of evidence.  And yet it is the special relations of
telling someone, being told, and accepting or refusing an-
other’s word that are the home of the network of beliefs we
acquire through human testimony.   And these relations, I
hope to show, provide a kind of reason for belief that is
8 Summarizing his line of criticism of one version of the reductionist thesis
associated with Hume, Coady says, “The difficulty consists in the fact that the
whole enterprise of RT' in its present form requires that we understand what tes-
timony is independently of knowing that it is, in any degree, a reliable form of
evidence” (p. 85).
categorically different from that provided by evidence.
Another way of putting this criticism would be to say
that arguments of the generality of Coady’s do not address
the question of what is distinctive about acquiring beliefs
from what people say, as compared with other things people
do.  At bottom, the epistemological role of communicative
speech is not seen as essentially different from that of other
behavior.  But the observable behavior of other people may
be a source of true beliefs in all sorts of ways, which need
have nothing to do with believing the other person.  I may
look out my window on a sunny day and see people bun-
dled up against the cold and then reliably conclude from this
that it must be colder outside than it otherwise looks.  This
transition in thought is not essentially different from the
picture according to which I observe the verbal behavior of
some exotic community and, in seeking to understand what
it means, necessarily rely on various assumptions about their
rationality and general awareness.   And here one could
point out that the same “rationalizing” or charitable con-
straint on understanding what these people say also pro-
vides a defeasible warrant for taking what we understand
them to say to be true.  This is because we take their speech
normally to express their beliefs, and we take their beliefs (as
interpreted by us) normally to be true.  This familiar, general
scheme applies in the same way to the behavior of the peo-
ple I see bundled up against the cold, and to the verbal be-
havior observed by the Radical Interpreter.  Pictured in this
way, one’s relation to the exotic speech community does not
involve being told anything at all, or believing them, any
more than it does in the case of the people observed from the
window.  In both cases it is just a matter of an inference from
behavior which is seen as rational to some conclusion about
the state of the world.  So nothing along these lines, justify-5
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ing the beliefs we acquire from other people, can count as a
vindication of our reliance on testimony, since it is not a vin-
dication of what we learn through believing other people.
This is, of course, the familiar role of speech and its rela-
tion to belief in contemporary philosophy of mind, and it
should not be surprising to see it exerting a degree of control
over the recent discussion of testimony.   Within this dis-
course, speech is seen as a kind of interpretable human be-
havior like any other.  When we interpret such behavior, we
seek to make it understandable within the rational categories
of what is called “folk psychology”, and ascribe beliefs and
other attitudes which will be reasonable approximations to
the True and the Good.  And this picture of our relation to
the speech of other people leads almost imperceptibly into a
view about testimony.  For we can argue from here: when
we interpret the speech of another we do not only learn
about the speaker; we also learn about the world.  Most ob-
viously, when someone makes an assertion we may not only
learn about what he believes, but if the assertion is true, we
may also learn the truth of what is asserted.  And if our in-
terpretation is guided by principles of charity, we will in-
deed take most of what people say to be true, even in cases
where we have no independent reason for thinking it true.
In this way, the fact of the other person’s belief (as inter-
preted by us) may function as our reason for believing the
same thing.  We thus gain true beliefs about persons as well
as about the world they are talking about.
Perversity, Dependence, and Risk
What this general scheme provides us with is a presumptive
right to share the beliefs we take the speaker to have.  But
other things being equal, we would have the very same right
however we learned of that person’s beliefs.
9  The epistemic
warrant described in this scheme need not involve a de-
pendence on speech any more than it did when I learned
about  the  weather  by  seeing  how  people  outside  were
dressed.   Speech, of course, can be an especially revealing
and fine-grained basis for belief-ascription, but from this
perspective it is but a particular instance of the more general
scheme of interpreting behavior.
Since it is knowledge of the other person’s beliefs that is
doing all the epistemic work on this picture, we should note
that while speech is in some obvious ways a privileged route
to such knowledge, it is also one which subjects the inter-
preter to special risks which are not shared by other possible
ways of coming to this same knowledge.   When I learn of
someone’s beliefs through what they tell me, I am dependent
on such things as their discretion, sincerity, good inten-
tions—in short, on how they deliberately present themselves
to me—in a way that I am not dependent when I infer their
beliefs in other ways.  People are known to lie, exaggerate,
and  otherwise  speak  in  ways  that  do  not  express  their
genuine beliefs.  Thus, in relying on what a person says, I am
incurring an additional risk that the behavior he is mani-
festing may be deliberately calculated to mislead me as to
what he believes.  I am here dependent on him, and his in-
tentions with respect to me, and not just on my own abilities
as an interpreter of the evidence.  This source of error is a
much  more  remote  possibility  in  the  case  of  inferences
drawn from the private observation of someone’s behavior.
The people bundled up against the cold could be dressed up
like that just so as to fool me, but this is hardly the everyday
occurrence that lying and misrepresentation are.  And that
9 With some obvious exceptions; for instance, if I learned of his beliefs from
the bragging admission of the person who deceived him.   But these sorts of
cases are just what is taken to be excluded by speaking of “other things being
equal”.6
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risk of error is not a possibility at all for those ways, real or
imaginary, of learning someone’s beliefs directly and with-
out the mediation of voluntary expression or behavior at all
(i.e., whatever is imagined in imagining the effects of truth-
serum, hypnotism, or brain-scans).  If the epistemic import
of what people say is at bottom that of an indication of what
they believe, it would seem perverse for us to give any
privileged status to the vehicle of knowledge (speech and as-
sertion) where we are most vulnerable because most de-
pendent on the free disposal of the other person.  And if we
are considering speech as evidence, we will have eventually
to face the question of how recognition of its intentional
character could ever enhance rather than detract from its
epistemic value for an audience.   Ordinarily, if I confront
something as evidence (the telltale footprint, the cigarette
butt left in the ashtray) and then learn that it was left there
deliberately, even with the intention of bringing me to a
particular belief, this will only discredit it as evidence in my
eyes.  It won’t seem better evidence, or even just as good, but
instead like something fraudulent, or tainted evidence.
Insofar as speech does occupy a privileged place in what
we learn from other people, this sort of view seems to pic-
ture us as perversely preferring to increase our epistemic ex-
posure, by placing ourselves at the mercy of the free dispo-
sition of another, according a privileged place to human
speech, which is here construed as a kind of evidence that
has been deliberately tampered with.   On the “evidential”
reconstruction of testimony, speech functions as no more
than  a  very  possibly  misleading  way  of  learning  the
speaker’s beliefs.  Other things being equal, some more di-
rect way of learning would be better; and in particular we
should prefer any way of learning the speaker’s beliefs that
was not wholly dependent on his overt, deliberate revelation
of them.  Anything that necessarily involved his free action
in this way, and thus brought with it the possibility of delib-
erate deceit, could only be a less reliable way of learning his
beliefs than some otherwise comparable way that involved
going behind his back (mind-reading, brain-scans, private
observation of his behavior).  If speech is seen as a form of
evidence, then once its intentional character is recognized
(that is, not just as intentional behavior, but intentional with
respect to inducing a particular belief), we need an account
of how it could count as anything more than doctored evi-
dence.
Assertion as Assurance
Let us contrast this view with another picture of how what
another person tells me may contribute to my belief, a pic-
ture that will give central place to the act of saying some-
thing and the response of believing or disbelieving the per-
son.  On a genuinely non-Humean account, when someone
tells me it’s cold out, I don’t simply gain an awareness of his
beliefs; I am also given his assurance that it’s cold out.  This is
something I could not have gained by the private observa-
tion of his behavior.  When someone gives me his assurance
that it’s cold out he explicitly assumes a certain responsibil-
ity for what I believe.  What this provides me with is differ-
ent in kind, though not necessarily in degree of certainty,
from beliefs I might have read off from his behavior, just as
what I gain from his declaration of intention differs from the
firm expectation I may form from knowing his habits.  On
the evidential picture, by contrast, the speaker’s assurance as
such just clouds the issue, since all the verbal expression of
assurance can do is interpose an additional piece of (possibly
misleading) evidence between me and what I really want to
know.  I now have some more behavior to interpret, verbal
this time, which brings with it special new possibilities for
being misled.  From my role as interpreter of others, my ul-7
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timate destination is the truth about the world, but often I
must pass through the beliefs of another person as my only
(fallible) access to this truth.  And now relying on what he
deliberately says provides me with at best a distinctively fal-
lible way of learning what his beliefs are.
On both views, when I take someone’s word for some-
thing I am peculiarly dependent on the will or discretion of
the speaker, in a way that I would not be in the situation of
interpreting the evidence of his behavior.  But they view this
dependence differently.  On the Assurance View, going be-
hind his back to learn his beliefs would not be better, or even
just as good.  Rather, it is essential to the distinctive reason
for belief that I get from assertion that it proceeds from
something freely undertaken by the other person.  Only as a
free declaration does it have that value for me.  Evidence, by
contrast, is not dependent on presentation in this way.   A
phenomenon will count as evidence however it came about,
whether by natural causes or by someone’s deliberate action,
or just as easily by his inadvertence or carelessness.   But
nothing  can  count  as  someone’s assurance that  was  not
freely presented as such, just as talking in one’s sleep cannot
count as making an assertion or a promise.
10  The two views,
then, oppose each other most directly over this issue of the
role of the speaker’s freedom, and the hearer’s dependence
on it.  On the Evidential View, dependence on the freedom
of the other person just saddles us with an additional set of
risks; now we have to worry not only about misleading
(natural) evidence but deliberate distortion as well.  On the
10 When in the course of a discussion of Moore’s Paradox and the idea of
“two people speaking through my mouth”, Wittgenstein asks, “Where is it said
in logic that an assertion [Behauptung] cannot be made in a trance?”, I under-
stand him roughly to be saying: Logic (on some conception of it) may well say
nothing about the speaker’s awareness of what he is doing in making an asser-
tion, just as the same conception of logic permits statements of the form ‘P, but I
don’t believe it’, but both possibilities are contrary to the point and hence the
meaning of assertions (Wittgenstein [1980], § 818).
Assurance View, dependence on someone’s freely assuming
responsibility for the truth of P, presenting himself as a kind
of guarantor, provides me with a characteristic reason to be-
lieve, different in kind from anything provided by evidence
alone.
In the remainder of this paper, I want to sketch out a de-
fense of the alternative picture above, and explore the case
for denying that human testimony should be thought of as
providing the same sort of reason for belief that ordinary
evidence does.  A guiding question will be: as hearers faced
with the question of believing what we are told, how are we
to understand the nature of our dependence on the free as-
sertion of the speaker, and how does this dependence affect
the question of whether our epistemic relation to what is
said is ultimately an evidential one?
In a ground-breaking paper on the central questions of
testimony, Angus Ross (1986) begins by raising the question
of whether it makes sense in general to treat what people say
as a form of evidence, and he explicitly relates this question
to the fact that speaking is a voluntary act.  I have some dif-
ferences with how he understands this relation, but the gen-
eral line of thought seems to me deeply right and worth de-
veloping.  Let me begin with a moderately lengthy quotation
from the early pages of Ross’s article.
11
The main problem with the idea that the hearer
views the speaker’s words as evidence arises
from the fact that, unlike the examples of natu-
11 I should add that I’ll only be discussing a part of Ross’s argument, fo-
cusing on his criticism of an Evidential View of testimony, and not his positive
account of how assertion contributes to belief.  Michael Welbourne’s account of
testimony in his monograph The Community of Knowledge has various affinities
with Ross’s, including the denial that an act of telling is presented by the
speaker as evidence, and an emphasis on believing the speaker as the target no-
tion for an understanding of testimony (and the concept of knowledge itself on
Welbourne’s view).8
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ral signs which spring most readily to mind,
saying something is a deliberate act under the
speaker’s conscious control and the hearer is
aware that this is the case.  The problem is not
that of whether the hearer can in these circum-
stances see the speaker’s words as good evi-
dence; it is a question of whether the notion of
evidence is appropriate here at all.  There is, of
course, nothing odd about the idea of deliber-
ately presenting an audience with evidence in
order to get them to draw a desired conclusion,
as when a photograph is produced in court.
But in such a case what is presented is, or is
presented as being, evidence independently of
the fact of the presenter having chosen to pre-
sent it.   If a speaker’s words are evidence of
anything, they have that status only because he
has chosen to use them.   Speaking is not like
allowing someone to see you are blushing.  The
problem is not, however, that the fact of our
having chosen to use certain words cannot be
evidence  for  some  further  conclusion.   Our
choices can certainly be revealing.   The diffi-
culty lies in supposing that the speaker himself
sees his choice of words in this light, which in
turn makes it difficult to suppose that this is
how the hearer is intended to see his choice.
(Ross, p. 72)
First of all, it should be noted that Ross’s target, like
mine, is not the class of all speech-acts, not even the class of
all assertoric speech acts.  Not everything done in speech, not
even  everything  done  with  sentences  in  the  declarative
mood, involves the specific relations of telling and being be-
lieved.  Assertions are also made in the context of argument
and demonstration, for instance, where there is no assump-
tion within the discourse that the speaker is to be believed
on his say-so.
12   In such a situation the speaker is not ex-
pecting to be believed but is attempting to provide independ-
ent convincing reasons for the truth of his view, or laying
out the steps of a proof.  Telling someone something is not
simply giving expression to what’s on your mind, but is
making a statement with the understanding that here it is
your word that is to be relied on.   It is a common enough
understanding, and commonly justified, but it is not one in
place  in  such  contexts  as  persuasion,  argumentation,  or
demonstration.  For different reasons it is also not the under-
standing of the speech of a person in the context of thera-
peutic treatment, in the oral examination of a pupil, or in the
police interrogation of a suspect.  Such discourses will con-
tain statements of various kinds, but they may be received by
the interlocutor in a very different spirit, as evidence for
truth of a very different kind from the overt subject of the
subject’s statement.  This again is quite different from the ex-
change of information through telling and being told in eve-
ryday life.  (And on the picture of speech to be developed
here, these other discourses emerge as ultimately dependent
on the central discourse of telling.)
Having said that, however, how is seeing my own utter-
ance as evidence supposed to be incompatible with seeing
my utterance as a voluntary act of mine, in Ross’s words
seeing it as “up to me what I shall say”?  He notes that there
is nothing in the idea of evidence itself which is inconsistent
with a person’s deliberately presenting something as such,
as when a photograph is introduced as evidence.   And, it
should also be noted, an item like a photograph can serve as
good evidence even when it was not only deliberately pre-
12 And if we take it that assertions are made in the course of following out a
proof, or in ad hominem argument, then it’s clear that their role in providing rea-
son for belief needn’t even depend on the assumption that the speaker believes
what he says.  See my paper “Problems of Sincerity” (2005).9
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sented but also deliberately produced so as to lead one to a
particular conclusion.  So why cannot the speaker have es-
sentially the same relation to his own words, as something
he deliberately produces and presents to serve as evidence
for some conclusion (and hence to bring the hearer to some
desired belief)?  Part of the answer Ross gives lies in the fol-
lowing view.   Seeing the utterance as evidence would in-
volve seeing it as the outcome of some general empirical
law, the sort of “reliable correlation” Hume has in mind,
connecting the making of the statement with the obtaining of
the facts in question.  Ross acknowledges that I may see the
words of others or my own past words in this light, but
What I cannot do is see the words I now choose
to utter in that light, for I cannot at one and the
same time see it as up to me what I shall say
and see my choice [...] as determined or con-
strained by facts about my own nature.  (73)
Such a stance toward one’s own utterances may be barely
possible, he says, but “it is hardly compatible with taking re-
sponsibility for those acts”.  While the emphasis on respon-
sibility is important, I don’t think this part of Ross’s response
leads in the right direction.  For, as far as “reliable correla-
tions” go, why could I not see my own utterance as securely
linked with the truth, not in virtue of my being determined
by the facts of my own nature, but in virtue of my own free
but unswerving commitment to the truth?  The sort of reli-
ability my Humean interlocutor wants to count on does not
abolish my freedom.  I can present myself to myself and oth-
ers as reliable in various ways, without that meaning that my
reliability is a constraint to which I am passively subject.  My
utterance is a voluntary act of mine, something I take re-
sponsibility for, and part of what I take responsibility for is
its correlation with the truth.   So it seems it cannot be be-
cause I see my utterance as freely chosen that it cannot be
taken by either myself or my audience as evidence for the
truth.
However, there is another strand in what Ross is saying
here that clarifies the role of the speaker’s freedom and its
clash with the idea of evidence.  In the first passage quoted
he says that something like a photograph will be evidence
“independently of the fact of the presenter having chosen to
present it”; whereas by contrast,
If a speaker’s words are evidence of anything,
they have that status only because he has cho-
sen to use them.
Strictly speaking, this last statement is not quite right, as
we’ve already briefly seen.  If we’ve agreed that in various
contexts a person’s words can be treated as evidence, then
this need not be dependent on the speaker’s having chosen to
use them.  If my analyst can adopt a symptomatic stance to-
ward my more conscious and deliberate statements, then he
may make similar revealing inferences from my botched ut-
terances, slips of the tongue, as well as the words I may utter
under hypnosis or while talking in my sleep.  Speaking is a
form of behavior, after all, and human behavior is infinitely
interpretable, infinitely revealing, in ways that are not at the
disposal of the person to determine their meaning.   One’s
words can be evidence when not chosen at all, revealing like
a cry of pain; or they can be evidence against one’s intent, as
when someone’s tone of voice reveals that he’s lying.  What
is true, however, but still in need of defense here, is that a
statement provides the kind of reason for belief that testi-
mony does only if it is understood to be something freely and
consciously undertaken by the speaker.  It is with respect to10
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this sort of reason for belief that we, as hearers or readers,
are essentially dependent on the free disposal of the speaker
or writer.  Thus, if the idea is that something is evidence, or
is being treated as evidence, when it is a reason for belief in-
dependently of whether it was intentionally produced or
presented as such, we need a fuller characterization of the
kind of “independence” that pertains to the category of evi-
dence, and defense of the idea that testimony as such pro-
vides reason for belief that is not independent of assump-
tions involving the freedom of the speaker.
Photographs and Statements
It is here that Ross’s passing contrast between our epistemic
relations to photographs and speakers is worth developing
in some detail.  There are many ways in which what we see
and what we believe may be dependent on what others do,
say, or show to us.  In my direct experience of a footprint, I
may be dependent not only on the person who made it but
also perhaps on someone who drew it to my attention.  And
when my epistemic relation to it is mediated by another per-
son in these ways, I am subject to the ordinary risks of dis-
tortion, since in principle any evidence may be tampered
with.  But even with these particular risks and dependencies,
my relation to the footprint is still a perceptual one and does
not involve me in the specific relation of believing another
person.  And this is so even if my perception of it is techno-
logically mediated in ways that involve the doings and ex-
pertise of other people.  In discussing the nature of photo-
graphic realism, Kendall Walton (1984) compares what we
see in photographs with what we see through a microscope
or in a mirror, to argue for the claim that in all three cases we
actually see the thing in question, even though this seeing is
mediated in various ways, and even though photographs
can be doctored in various ways.
13   Real experience of a thing
13 For purposes of the account of testimony developed here, we need not of
may also be mediated or subject to various epistemic risks,
without that abolishing the difference between being told
about it and experiencing it oneself.  As Walton points out,
what I see directly when someone points out the window
may also be altered in various ways to deceive, but that
doesn’t transform the situation from perception to depiction.
In Walton’s terms, a photograph can be “transparent” to the
scene it depicts in part because, unlike the case of a drawing,
what we see here is not essentially dependent on what the
photographer thinks is there in the photograph.  As with a
telescope, we may “see through” the photograph to the
scene itself.
In this regard, consider the case of the photographer in
Antonioni’s movie Blow Up (1966).  He takes some pictures
in the park of a woman and a man, and then later discovers
that one of his shots apparently shows the man’s corpse ly-
ing in the bushes.  This is not what he saw or believed at the
time, but it is what he sees now.   Still, the photograph he
took is evidence, of the most ordinary kind, for the fact that
this man has been killed.  And it is evidence for this regard-
less of the photographer’s beliefs about the matter.  That is, it
would be evidence even if he positively disbelieved what it
shows, or even if he took the photograph and showed it to
someone with the deliberate intent to deceive.  Its status as
evidence is wholly independent of his beliefs or intentions.
And it is for that reason that his own relation to the photo-
graph can be an evidential one, like that of a detective or
other investigator.   When he gets home he crops and en-
larges  and  studies his  photograph  in  order  to  see  more
deeply into what it shows, to convince himself that the
corpse on the grass is really there.  In this way his own epis-
temic relation to the photograph he took is the same as that
                                                                                                                    
course follow Walton in his claim that the object itself is in fact seen in the
photograph, for it is precisely the differences between photographs and asser-
tions that concern me here.11
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of the friend he shows it to later.  They can both learn from
it, or doubt what it shows.  The situation would be quite dif-
ferent if he were to have made a sketch of what he saw in the
park, or taken some notes on what he observed there.   It
would be absurd for him take his sketch home and blow up
it to examine more closely what it shows about the man in
the park.  And were he to show his sketch or his notes to an-
other person to convince him about the man in the park, he
would be offering him a very different kind of reason to be-
lieve what happened.  If he shows his friend a sketch of a
corpse lying in the grass, and this is to be a reason for him to
believe there was such a corpse, his friend has to assume
such things as that the sketch was not made with an intent to
deceive, that the person who made it was observing things
accurately and not liable to error, and even that the aim of
the sketch was an accurate picture and not an imaginary
scene, etc.  In short, the beliefs and intentions of the person
who made the sketch are crucial for its status as a reason to
believe anything about what was there in the park.  Without
those assumptions, the sketch does not become poorer evi-
dence; it ceases to be evidence of any kind, or any other rea-
son to believe.  It’s just a piece of paper, and any correlation
with  the  facts  in  the  park  could  only  be  by  the  merest
chance.
So how does the issue of freedom figure in here, in a way
that distinguishes the case of verbal testimony?  After all, the
photographer freely takes his picture, and then may freely
present it to another person as a reason for believing a man
has been killed.  How is this different from his friend’s rela-
tion to his verbal report of what he saw?   So far we have
seen the following difference.  The status of the photograph
as a reason to believe something does not depend on the
photographer’s own attitude toward it as evidence.   It de-
pends only on the camera’s ability to record the scene, which
need not involve any choice or consciousness on the part of
the photographer at all.   (The exposure could have been
made by a remote timing device.)  As such the photograph
can serve for him as an independent correction of his im-
pression of the scene, in a way that his drawing cannot.  It is
for this reason that when he looks at his photograph with his
friend, they both stand in the same epistemic relation to it;
confronting it as independent, public evidence and trying to
discern its import.
By contrast, the speaker’s choice enters in essentially to the
fact that his utterance counts at all as a reason for belief.  The
point is not that his utterance is voluntarily produced, for
that in itself has no epistemic significance and does not dis-
tinguish the case from that of the photographer.  Rather the
point is that the speaker, in presenting his utterance as an as-
sertion, one with the force of telling the audience something,
presents himself as accountable for the truth of what he says,
and in doing so he offers a kind of guarantee for this truth.
This shows up in the fact that if we are inclined to believe
what the speaker says, but then learn that he is not, in fact,
presenting  his  utterance  as  an  assertion  whose  truth  he
stands behind, then what remains are just words, not a rea-
son to believe anything.   We misunderstood the intent of
Professor Higgins when we heard him say something about
the rain in Spain, and now upon realizing this, the utterance
as phenomenon loses the epistemic import we thought it had
(whatever  knowledge  we  may  indeed  take  him  to  have
about such matters).  By contrast, if we learn that the pho-
tographer is not, in fact, presenting his photograph as a true
record of what occurred in the park, the photograph as
document retains all the epistemic value for us it ever had.
The Importance of Being Non-Natural
Still, one might ask, why speak of the audience’s depend-
ence on the freedom of the speaker, rather than simply refer12
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to their dependence on what the speaker has (freely) done?
The reason is that the relevant speaker’s responsibility is not
simply his responsibility for the existence of some phenome-
non, in the sense that he is the one who deliberately pro-
duced these spoken words.  Rather, he is more centrally re-
sponsible for those words’ having any particular epistemic
status.  What is the difference, then, between the speaker’s
role in providing something (his utterance) with a particular
epistemic status and the role of someone like a photographer
who produces something that has a certain epistemic import?
It is here, I think, that a consideration of Paul Grice’s
original 1957 paper “Meaning” proves helpful.  The relation
of  evidence,  one  phenomenon’s  being  an  indication  of
something else, is the central form of what Grice calls “natu-
ral meaning”.  Natural meaning is not something at the dis-
posal of the speaker to confer or revoke but is a matter of the
independent obtaining of causal relations in the world (e.g,
the way smoke means fire, or doesn’t).  Nonetheless, persons
belong to this same natural world and may thus produce or
exhibit various evidential phenomena and employ them to
get some point across (e.g., pointing to the smoke pouring
out of the oven).  But spoken words typically bear a different
relation to the facts.   In his 1957 article, Grice is primarily
concerned to delineate the conditions for something he calls
“non-natural meaning”, or “MeaningNN”.  This project fa-
mously evolved into an attempt to ground the notion of the
meaning of an expression in a language in the complex in-
tentions had by utterers of expressions on occasions of use;
and, presented as a non-circular account of either word-
meaning or sentence-meaning, it was progressively refined
into  baroque  complexity  under  the  pressure  of  counter-
examples.   However, the interest and importance of the
original account of non-natural meaning is not exhausted by
the prospects for an intention-based semantics of the sort he
proposed.  What he isolates under the title of “non-natural
meaning” is a central form of intersubjective dependence,
one that is indeed paradigmatically linguistic, but not re-
stricted to linguistic communication.
A striking thing about the essay is how the technical no-
tion of non-natural meaning is introduced by contrast with
natural meaning, as if this were an antecedently intuitive
notion, one whose definition we could progressively refine
by consulting our intuitions about a series of well-crafted
cases and asking ourselves whether we should call that a
case of non-natural meaning.  We are given hints, of course,
by way of both similarity and contrast with more familiar
notions like that of conventional meaning, but Grice’s target
notion only emerges through the consideration of the cases
devised and presented.   The cases themselves all have a
similar form in that in all of them one person does some-
thing which either succeeds or not in inducing another per-
son to some belief P.  This common telos to the cases invites
two related questions.  Since the end-point of each of these
encounters is that one person ends up with a new belief, we
might look at the progression of cases from an epistemologi-
cal point of view and ask what it is that brings the person at
the receiving end to this new belief, what reason he may take
himself to have been given for adopting it, and why the par-
ticular kind of reason Grice’s account of non-natural mean-
ing zeros in on should be of special significance, either epis-
temologically or otherwise.  It is not, of course, as if the other
ways of inducing belief, disqualified as candidates for the
non-natural,  are  thought  to  be  insufficiently  grounded.
Salome, for instance, certainly acquired justified belief about
the fate of John the Baptist by seeing his head presented on a
charger, however this may fall short as a case of non-natural
meaning.  Rather, the target notion of non-natural meaning
is meant to capture a way of gaining a reason to believe13
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something that is importantly different from others and that
we have special reason to be concerned with, both as pur-
veyors and receivers of such reasons.  So the first question is:
what is special about the reason for belief associated with
non-natural meaning?  And secondly, as the proposed defi-
nition of non-natural meaning is progressively refined in
Grice’s essay, what pre-theoretical notion is supposed to be
guiding our intuitions along the way, so that we can feel
conviction about a range of cases that seem to fall more or
less squarely in the category?  Here Grice is more explicit,
since by way of explaining the distinction that matters to
him, and why something like the case of Herod’s presenta-
tion to Salome does not count as non-natural meaning, he
says, “What we want to find is the difference between, for
example, ‘deliberately and openly letting someone know’
and ‘telling’ and between ‘getting someone to think’ and
‘telling’” (44).   So it is the ordinary notion of telling someone
something, that way of inducing belief, that is to play a
guiding role in determining which cases satisfy the philoso-
phical notion of non-natural meaning, and Grice’s distinc-
tion between natural and non-natural meaning can be seen
as motivated by a concern with the difference between telling
a person that P and other ways of bringing him to that same
knowledge, such as providing him with evidence for P (evi-
dence that may be accidental or contrived, openly displayed
or inadvertently revealed).
As examples of “deliberately and openly letting someone
know” some fact, Grice cites such cases as that of showing
someone  a  compromising  photograph  or  “leav[ing]  the
china my daughter has broke lying around for my wife to
see”.
14  In these cases, the phenomenon in question has some
independent evidential significance, even though the person
may be responsible either for drawing attention to it (the
14 Grice (1957), in Strawson, ed., p. 44.   Ross discusses natural vs. non-
natural meaning at p. 74.
broken china) or actually producing it (the photograph).
Their independent significance shows up in the fact that the
photograph or the china would have functioned as a reason
for the belief in question without anyone’s intervention or
presentation, even if only stumbled upon accidentally.  By
contrast, in cases of telling or non-natural meaning, the per-
son (hereafter the “speaker”) plays quite a different role in
bringing his audience to believe something.  Here, as is well
known, a crucial role is played in Grice’s account by the rec-
ognition of the speaker’s intention.  Examining this role will
help clarify the specific “dependence on the freedom of the
speaker” that I’m claiming is characteristic of the relation of
testimony, and which distinguishes it from a relation of evi-
dence.
Following Grice’s progression then: a handkerchief left at
the scene of the crime may throw suspicion on someone and
perhaps lead to genuine belief in his guilt.  But as a piece of
evidence it would induce that belief whether or not it were
left there intentionally, and non-natural meaning (and tell-
ing, surely) must at least be the upshot of something inten-
tionally done.   Further, it should be part of non-natural
meaning that the intention to induce a particular belief is
manifest to the person on the receiving end, and not like art-
fully planted evidence designed to steer him toward the de-
sired conclusion.  Further still, this belief-inducing intention
must not simply be known to the audience, something he
pieces together despite the speaker’s best efforts at conceal-
ment; rather the speaker must fully expect and intend that
his intention will be manifest to his audience.  In this way,
the audience can appreciate that another person is openly
playing a role in directing him to learn something, by pre-
senting a piece of evidence for them both to see and assess.
This makes this knowledge, or at least this awareness of the
evidence, “mutual” between them and hence available as an
object of cognitive and communicative cooperation between14
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them.  However, this is not yet non-natural meaning, since
these conditions are fulfilled when Herod presents the head
of St. John to Salome, or when the compromising photo-
graph is flourished.  Here, although the audience has been
directly and openly led to some belief, she has not been told
anything.   Rather, Salome has been shown something and
reliably left to draw her own conclusions.  Herod manifests a
definite intention in bringing her this news, and he bears an
obvious responsibility for Salome’s altered state of belief.
But there is yet another responsibility he does not assume
here, which marks the difference between “‘deliberately and
openly letting someone know” and “telling”, and this is
shown in the fact that, while his intention regarding her be-
lief is indeed manifest, it is inert as far as Salome’s belief is
concerned, just as it is when the person is shown a compro-
mising photograph.  It isn’t doing any epistemological work
of its own.   Both people would draw essentially the same
conclusions whether the evidence in question were deliber-
ately and openly displayed to them or not.  So we might say
that Herod’s epistemic responsibility for Salome’s belief is
merely contingent, like that of the person showing the pho-
tograph.  In these cases they play a role in making a piece of
evidence available to another person, but they are not re-
sponsible for its having the epistemic import it has.
For Grice, however, nothing can count as a case of non-
natural meaning if the relevant belief could be expected to be
produced whether or not the intention behind the action
were recognized.  The speaker must not only intend that the
audience recognize his intention, but this recognition must
itself play a role in inducing the belief in question, and that
means that the recognition of the speaker’s intention must
not just as a matter of fact help to bring about the relevant
belief but must be necessary to its inducement.  In this way
we  arrive  at  Grice’s  original  formulation  of  non-natural
meaning in his 1957 paper:
A uttered x with the intention of inducing a
belief by means of the recognition of this in-
tention. (45)
If the audience could not be expected to arrive at the in-
tended belief apart from the recognition of the speaker’s in-
tention regarding that belief, the speaker must take upon
himself the role of providing something with a particular
epistemic import that it otherwise would not have, and in
this way Grice sharply distinguishes non-natural meaning
from the presentation of evidence.   For any phenomenon
with some independent evidential import will naturally be
one which might well be expected to induce belief without
the recognition of anyone’s intention. That’s just what it is
for a phenomenon to be ordinary evidence for something
else.   If his utterance is to count as an instance of telling
someone something, however, the speaker must present his
action as being without epistemic significance apart from his
explicit assumption of responsibility for that significance.  In
this way he announces that the reason for belief offered here
is of a different kind from that stemming from externally
obtaining evidential relations.
As Ross points out (p. 75), from the point of view of the
audience the role of the recognition of intention, considered
as a reason for belief, is left somewhat mysterious here.  The
question is: just how does my recognizing that this speaker
intends that I should believe P play a role in actually getting
me to believe that P?  If we compare this case with that of
other things someone may want me to do it’s clear that the
mere recognition that he wants me to do X does not, in gen-
eral, provide me with much of any reason at all for comply-
ing.  Why should we be so much more compliant when we15
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recognize that someone wishes us to believe  something?
How can the mere recognition of someone’s intention be ex-
pected to induce belief?
When looked at in this way, recognition of the speaker’s
intention may seem inadequate to induce belief.  It may also
seem pointless, adding nothing of epistemic value to what
the audience already has.   Again, compare this with the
picture of radical interpretation, according to which the
epistemic significance of speech is that of an indication of the
speaker’s beliefs.  Once I employ this scheme of interpreta-
tion to learn what the speaker believes, I am then in posses-
sion of knowledge of a certain set of facts, viz., the speaker’s
state of belief, which does have straightforward evidential
value for me, quite independently of how or whether the
fact  of  his  believing  is  explicitly  presented  to  me.   The
speaker’s state of mind is a phenomenon, which has the
same independent evidential import for me, regardless of
how I may have learned of it, and regardless of whether it
was manifested deliberately or inadvertently.   And, as we
saw, this same scheme of interpretation can provide a basis
for me to infer to the likely truth of these beliefs, and so come
to share them myself.   I ascribe beliefs on the basis of his
verbal behavior as I would from any other behavior, and in
neither case do I rely on recognition of any intention to mani-
fest his states of mind.  And indeed, what could be the epis-
temic interest for me in learning of any such intention on his
part?   By hypothesis, I already know what he takes to be
true, and I can now make of this knowledge what I will, de-
ciding for myself whether this adds up to good reason for me
to take his belief to be true.  If his verbal behavior is evidence
for his beliefs, then it doesn’t add to my evidence as inter-
preter  to  learn  that,  in  addition  to  his  believing  P,  the
speaker also has the intention that I should believe P too
(and come to this belief on the basis of recognition of that
very intention, etc.).  From my side, either learning of his be-
lief is, on balance, sufficient for me to believe P too, or it is
not.   Nothing further about his intentions, or just how he
would like me to arrive at this belief, will be evidentially
relevant for me at all.  Or else, as before with the tainted evi-
dence, learning that his belief was deliberately manifested
now casts doubt on my ascription, because the evidence of
his behavior is now contaminated by its aspect of perform-
ance.
What is needed is more direct focus on the speaker’s ex-
plicit presentation of himself as providing a reason for belief.
For it is not, in fact, the audience’s mere awareness of the
speaker’s intention that is to provide a motivation for belief.
If I simply discovered on my own that this person had the in-
tention that I believe P, this need not count for me as a rea-
son for belief at all.  (Why cooperate with his designs on me,
however benign?)  The conditions given so far still have not
accounted for any special importance to the overt act of say-
ing, the explicit manifesting of one’s intention, as opposed to
simply doing something that allows one’s intention to be-
come known.   If, unlike a piece of evidence, the speaker’s
words have no independent epistemic value as a phenome-
non, then how do they acquire the status of a reason to be-
lieve something?  It seems that this can only be by virtue of
the speaker’s there and then explicitly presenting his utter-
ance as a reason to believe, with this presentation being ac-
complished in the act of assertion itself.  The epistemic value
of his words is something publicly conferred on them by the
speaker, by presenting his utterance as an assertion.   And
indeed, it is because the speaker’s words have no independ-
ent status as evidence that their contribution to the audi-
ence’s belief must proceed through the recognition of the
speaker’s intention.  Further, the intention seeking recogni-
tion must not simply be that the audience come to believe16
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something, but must include the intention that the audience
recognize the speaker’s act of asserting as itself constituting
a reason for belief.  If it seems difficult to see how anything,
even someone’s words, could acquire some epistemic value
through something like conferral, perhaps because this sug-
gests something too arbitrary or ceremonial to constitute a
genuine reason for belief, it should be remembered that for
both parties this conferral is by its nature an overt assump-
tion of specific responsibilities on the part of the speaker.
This is no more (or less) mysterious than how an explicit
agreement or contract alters one’s responsibilities, actions
which are also within the capacities of ordinary speakers.
The speaker’s intent, then, is that for the audience, the very
fact that this speaker is freely and explicitly presenting P as
worthy of belief constitutes his speech as a reason to believe
that P.
Of course, as with any public assumption of responsibil-
ity, the appropriate abilities and other background condi-
tions must be assumed to be in place for it to amount to
anything.  For the speaker to be able to do this it must be as-
sumed by both parties that the speaker does indeed satisfy
the right conditions for such an act (e.g., that he possesses
the relevant knowledge, trustworthiness, and reliability).
These background conditions can themselves be construed
as evidential, or at any rate not at the behest of the speaker
to determine, but they are not themselves sufficient for giv-
ing any epistemic significance to the speaker’s words, for the
relevance of these conditions only comes into play once it is
understood that a particular speech-act is being performed
with those words (i.e., an assertion or promise rather than
something else).  The speaker has to constitute his utterance
as having this or that illocutionary force before the empirical
background conditions can contribute anything to its epis-
temic significance.  Hence the idea is not that the speaker’s
word’s “all by themselves” should count as a reason for be-
lief, or that the speaker’s authority over the constitution of
the particular speech act he is performing (e.g., as assertion
rather than recitation) shoulders the epistemic burden all by
itself.  As with the explicit assumption of responsibility that
goes with making a promise, its success will depend on the
various conditions that go into the speaker’s being in a posi-
tion to take on any such responsibility, and which make for
his public assumption’s being anything for another person to
count on.  But in considering the speaker’s words, the audi-
ence’s belief in his knowledge and trustworthiness do not do
him any epistemic good if it is still left open just what kind of
action (if any) the speaker is presenting his utterance as.  As
far as relating to his words goes, the speaker’s knowledge
and trustworthiness are epistemically inert for the audience
until the question of the particular speech-act or illocution is
settled.   Determining his utterance as an assertion is what
gets the speaker’s words into the realm of epistemic assess-
ment in the first place (or at least epistemic assessment of the
sort that is relevant to testimony: we may indeed make evi-
dential use of the words or inarticulate sounds made by
someone asleep).   And in this matter, the speaker and his
audience are in essentially different relations to the epis-
temic import of the speaker’s words.  The speaker does not
relate to the question whether his utterance is a committed
assertion or not as something to be settled by evidence, be-
cause as a speaker of the language he plays an essential role
in making it the case that his utterance is an assertion or not.
Hence Grice’s original formulation needs some further
refinement.  The speaker intends not just that the recognition
of his intention play a role in producing belief that P, but
that the particular role this recognition should play is that of
showing the speaker to be assuming responsibility for the
status of his utterance as a reason to believe P.  This addition17
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is necessary since in principle there are all sorts of ways in
which the recognition of intention could “play a role” in
producing  belief,  ways  that  would  not  capture  what  is
meant by “telling” or “non-natural meaning”, or the correla-
tive notion of believing the speaker.  One such way would
be manifested in the familiar situations of “double-bluffing”
where, e.g., I tell you I’m traveling to Minsk, knowing you’ll
take me to be lying and attempting to conceal my plans to
travel to Pinsk, and hence meaning to deceive you about my
genuine plans to go to Minsk after all.   Knowing all this
about me, however, you see through the ruse and conclude
that I’m indeed going to Minsk, just as I told you.  Here the
recognition of intention does indeed play an essential role in
the belief arrived at, and the audience comes to believe that
what I say is true, but this is not a case of believing the
speaker.
15  And there are other possible ways in which the
recognition of intention might play a role, even a necessary
one, but of the wrong sort.
Grice is sensitive to an incompleteness here, when he
suggests toward the end that it should somehow be built
into the definition that “the intended effect must be some-
thing which in some sense is within the control of the audi-
ence, or that in some sense of ‘reason’ the recognition of in-
tention behind X is for the audience a reason and not merely
a cause” (46).   It is not the speaker’s aim that the belief in
question be produced by the audience’s simply being so
constituted that his awareness of the speaker’s complex self-
referential intention somehow produces the belief in him.
That would fail in another way to describe the nature of the
dependence on the person as such and the importance of
mutual recognition.  For the audience must not simply re-
15 At the end of her (1979) paper, Anscombe points out that it is a require-
ment of any successful account of the phenomenon that it explain why we only
speak of believing someone when we take them to be both right about the facts
and truthful in intent.
spond with belief but must understand what the speaker is
saying, and must understand what the speaker is doing in
saying P, which is to say, purporting to present him with a
reason for P.  And the audience must believe P because he
understands what the speaker is saying and what he is do-
ing in saying it.   In addition, and crucially, the audience
must take this entire understanding to be shared by himself
and the speaker.  That is, he takes himself to be responding
to just the kind of reason for belief that the speaker is pre-
senting himself as offering (which is why cases of “double-
bluffing” are not cases of believing the speaker).
Any of the “proto-Gricean” ways of producing belief, the
cases leading up to the full definition of non-natural mean-
ing,  provide  us  with  something  mediating  between  the
audience and the speaker, something other than the person
as such that is being depended on.  Believing the speaker, on
the other hand, involves accepting the offer to rely on him
and not something connected with him or as a consequence
of  what  he  has  done.   This  direct  dependence  on  the
speaker’s offer of responsibility is what is expressed in the
‘hereby’ that is implied, and sometimes explicitly stated, in
illocutions such as telling, warning, or accepting, for it is in
this very presentation of himself that the speaker assumes
responsibility  for  the  audience’s  belief.
16   The  implied
‘hereby’ is thus also an expression of the self-referentiality of
the Gricean formula, for it declares that it is dependence on
the person as such, and not on something else he might
point to, that is solicited in saying that he hereby tells his
audience that P.
17  In this way we can see the progressive re-
16 Austin (1962), p. 57.
17 Here I agree with Harman (1986) in seeing as mistaken Grice’s later at-
tempts to eliminate the self-referentiality in his original formulation for non-
natural meaning: “Much of this complexity is artificial and due to Grice’s re-
fusal to stick with the original analysis and its appeal to a self-referential inten-
tion” (p. 88).18
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finements of Grice’s definition of non-natural meaning as
each aimed at laying bare the reliance of the audience on the
other person as such.  The belief is to be produced not sim-
ply by the speaker’s action, or by his intention, or by the
audience’s awareness of his intention, or anything else out-
side their encounter.   Just as the audience could treat the
handkerchief or the photograph as evidence for P, and thus
without trusting the speaker for the truth of P, so he could
treat the speaker’s action or intention as a similar kind of
evidence without trusting the speaker, without his belief that
P involving dependence on the person of the speaker as
such.
When Grice says that the belief in question should be
“something which in some sense is within the control of the
audience”, or that it should function as a reason for him and
not a mere cause, this is not meant to suggest that the audi-
ence complies with the speaker’s intention as a kind of favor,
adopting the belief on request (as Ross notes, p. 74).  But it
does serve to clarify the kind of role that is to be played by
the mutual recognition of the speaker’s intention, how that
can matter epistemically to the audience in the way sug-
gested by Grice’s progressive refinements of the account of
non-natural meaning.  The account of this role suggested by
the Assurance View is that the mutual recognition of inten-
tion can play the role for the audience of providing him with
a reason for belief, because he sees the speaker as presenting
himself  as  accountable  for  the  truth  of  P,  and  asking,
through the recognition of his intention, that this offer of his
assurance be accepted.  And it is understood by both parties
that this acceptance is something which the audience is free
to  give  or  refuse.   The  speaker  is  asking  that  a  certain
authority of his be acknowledged—the authority to invest
his utterance with a particular epistemic import—and this
investment occurs by his explicit assumption of responsibil-
ity for his utterance’s being a reason for belief.  This is the
role for the recognition of intention that the speaker is asking
for.  And, I would argue, it is only such a role that could ac-
count for how, in the case of speech, the recognition of in-
tention enhances rather than detracts from the epistemic
status of the phenomenon (utterance), reveals it to be some-
thing other than doctored evidence.
The  idea  of  assertion  as  providing  reason  for  belief
through the explicit assumption of responsibility for the
truth of what is said accounts for a number of contrasts be-
tween  belief  through  testimony  and  belief  through  con-
fronting evidence.  It points the way to understanding how
the recognition of intention can play a positive role, rather
than seeing it as something that is either epistemically ir-
relevant or undermining to the evidential value of the utter-
ance.  Further, a specific assumption of responsibilities is es-
sentially an expression of a person’s freedom, something
that only makes sense as consciously assumed.  It is for this
reason that words spoken during sleep or under hypnosis do
not have the value of testimony, because they do not count
as assertions, whatever expressive psychological value they
might still retain as evidence.  Like a promise or an apology,
something only counts as a person’s assertion when con-
sciously presented as such by him.
18
Promises  and  apologies,  like  acts  of  telling  someone
something, can be more or less reflective, more or less delib-
18 Coady (45-46) distinguishes genuine testimony from the situation of
someone who has been hypnotized specifically to say something, perhaps even
with the expectation of being believed.  But his reason for excluding this case is
different from mine.   For Coady, this cannot count as “testifying” because it
fails to satisfy the condition that the speaker “has the relevant competence,
authority, or credentials to state truly that P” (42), since the words have more or
less been “planted” in the subject.  This focus on epistemic authority seems mis-
placed, however.  For the speaker in this case could after all also happen to have
the requisite competence and authority on the subject.  Instead, the reason this
doesn’t count as testimony is that, in his present condition, he is not presenting
himself as responsible for P’s being true.19
Richard Moran Getting Told and Being Believed
erate, done more or less voluntarily or under duress.  Refer-
ence to the speaker’s assumption of responsibility for the
truth of what he says is not meant to deny that much of our
speech is spontaneous and unreflective, or that much of
what we acquire from the speech of others is more or less
passively absorbed.  Telling also includes telling something
by mistake, to the wrong person, or just blurting something
out when we meant to keep silent.  We express our freedom
not only in our considered actions but also in the actions that
go wrong or are forced upon us, and the outbursts that we
immediately  regret.   Blurting  something  out  when  you
meant to keep silent is still a different matter from either
talking in one’s sleep or having the utterance of those words
be produced by electrical stimulation of the cortex.  And the
epistemic significance for the audience is entirely different in
the two kinds of cases: in relating to the words produced by
electrical stimulation we may learn something, but what we
learn need not be dependent on such assumptions as, e.g.,
whether the person had any understanding of the words
themselves, or any sense that he was providing anyone with
a reason to believe something.  These assumptions, however,
are still indispensable to the understanding of the words that
escape us or are forced from us, and they express the role of
the person as such in providing a reason.  This is confirmed
by the fact that both speaker and audience relate to the
blurting out differently than they would to the cases of
talking in one’s sleep or through electrical stimulation.  In
the latter case, the speaker would not regret what he said or
try to make amends; in a sense what happened didn’t in-
volve him at all.
19  And for that matter, a person may also lie
19 Holton (1994) provides an illuminating focus on the role of what Straw-
son refers to as the Participant Stance and the Reactive Attitudes, especially with
regard to the distinction between belief through trust and belief through reliance.
Holton says of the latter case, “Seen in this way, a person is like a measuring
device: they respond to the environment in various ways, and we infer from their
response to what the environment is like” (74).
spontaneously or out of panic as well as tell the truth.  But
surely the description of a person telling a lie makes refer-
ence to such things as the intention, whether conscious or
not, to exploit the trust of his audience and present himself
as providing them with a reason for belief.   At the same
time, it is consistent with the Assurance View to think of as-
sertions and tellings as something like the default assump-
tion for indicative sentences in the declarative mood.  It re-
quires more, rather than less, sophisticated intentions to ut-
ter ‘The rain in Spain falls mainly on the plain’ and not mean
it as an assertion.   And so, barring any special reason to
think otherwise, we may be entitled to treat an utterance of
an indicative sentence as an assertion of it.
20  But in a given
case we may be wrong about this, and it remains true that
what settles the question about the status of the utterance is
whether or not the speaker is presenting it as true.
The Speaker’s Conferral: Having Your Say, Giving Your Word
We are now in a position to clarify the problem Ross sug-
gested with the idea of a speaker’s presenting his utterance
as evidence for his audience.   The problem is not that the
speaker’s words could not be taken as evidence by his audi-
ence.  In principle, anything said or done by the speaker can
be given a symptomatic reading.   Nor is it true that the
speaker could not privately intend that his words be taken as
evidence.  This would be the intention for many cases of de-
ceit or more everyday manipulation, for instance.  In a given
case, my primary aim may be for my listener to draw the
conclusion  that  I’m  being  scrupulously  candid  or  self-
revealing, and I accomplish this by confessing some minor
fault of mine.  Here, I am not telling anyone of my candor,
giving my word on it (whatever good that would do), but
20 Something like this assumption is expressed in Bernard Williams’ idea of
assertion as the “direct expression” of one’s belief (Williams [2002], p. 74 et
passim), which I discuss in  Moran (2005), pp. 347-50.20
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rather doing something (in this case: saying something) that
I hope will be taken as evidence for it.  When it is a question
of non-natural meaning, by contrast, the speaker is not rely-
ing on evidential relations alone to get his point across, but
rather is counting on the explicit presentation of his inten-
tion to be the very thing which makes his words a reason for
believing something in the first place.  The recognition of his
intention could only function this way if it was seen to be his
assurance of the truth in question, his explicit assumption of
responsibility for the truth of what he says.  By contrast, the
presentation of his utterance as evidence would be an im-
plicit denial of this responsibility, breaking the link between
the proposition he is giving his backing to and the belief he
is hoping to induce, in which case there’s no question of be-
lieving him.   Thus, for the speaker to present his word as
evidence would be for him to present it as a reason to be-
lieve, while suspending the guarantee that gives it the epis-
temic significance of testimony in the first place.  This is the
problem Ross is pointing to.
21
And as we have seen, to present something as evidence is
to present it as having its epistemic value independent of
one’s own beliefs about it, or one’s presentation of it, or the
conferral of some status upon it.  To offer some phenomenon
as evidence is to present it as belief-worthy independently of
the fact of one’s presenting it as belief-worthy.   When we
present something as evidence for someone, we are inviting
that person to “see for himself”, to find it convincing as we
21 Ross, p. 79: “No abandonment of the agent’s perspective, no abdication
of responsibility for one’s actions, is involved in seeing those actions as gener-
ating entitlements and obligations, either on the part of ourselves or on the part
of others.  (Compare the case of promising or issuing a command.)  There is on
the present account no difficulty in seeing the hearer as taking the speaker’s
words in the spirit in which they are honestly offered.”
See also Robert Brandom’s richly developed account of assertion in terms
of the constellation of entitlements and obligations, in Chapter 3 of Making It
Explicit.
do.  And we are prepared to offer reasons why it should be
convincing, reasons independent of our simply claiming,
once again, that it is belief-worthy.  To present something as
evidence is to be in a position to report that it is a reason for
belief, and to be in this position one must be presenting that
claim of belief-worthiness as having a basis in fact that is in-
dependent of one’s reporting itself.  A photograph has such
an independent epistemic basis, independent of anyone’s
conferral.  As a phenomenon, it counts as a reason for belief
independently of anything concerning how the photogra-
pher may conceive it or present it.   Because of this inde-
pendence, its epistemic status is something the photographer
himself may discover about it, or speculate about.  His rela-
tion to this question is in principle no different from anyone
else’s.  He may, of course, happen to know something about
how it was produced that we don’t know, and which may
affect its epistemic status.  But he may not know anything of
the sort, and conversely we might know more about it than
he does.  He marshals the same kinds of reasons as any other
viewer in considering the question of what beliefs the pho-
tograph may provide a basis for.
But the speaker’s relation to the epistemic status of his
own  assertion is  different  from  anyone  else’s.   For  the
speaker, it is not a matter of observation or speculation
whether he is indeed presenting his utterance as something
with the force of a committed assertion, and were he some-
how unclear about this, then to that degree his utterance
would be something less than a committed assertion.   He
may inquire into his own reliability, truthfulness, and com-
mand of the facts, but the status of his utterance as assertion
is a matter of what he is then and there prepared to invest it
with.  It has been noted by more than one philosopher that
the relation of ‘believing someone’ does not have a reflexive21
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form; it is not a relation a person can bear to himself.
22  The
problem with this, we can now say, is the problem with the
idea of a person offering and accepting an epistemic guar-
antee from himself, which would require him to be simulta-
neously in command of and at the mercy of his own free-
dom.  This is another basic feature of testimony not captured
by an evidential perspective on it.  Speaker and audience do
not confront the utterance as a phenomenon with an inde-
pendent or natural epistemic status which they could assess
in the same spirit, for the speaker does not confront his own
assertion as a phenomenon at all, but as an issue of his com-
mitment.  To speak of “conferral” of epistemic status is in-
tended to register the fact that to count an utterance as, e.g.,
an assurance or a promise just is to count it as something
presented with a particular epistemic status, the status of a
reason for some belief (as contrasted with the status, say, of
recitation  or  ironic  mimicry).   To  count  as  a  competent
speaker of a language is to be recognized as having defini-
tive “say” over which illocution one’s utterance counts as,
whether as informative assertion, or as promise or apology,
whether as a mere recitation or as a claim expressing one’s
commitment.   An utterance counts as an assertion or an
apology just in case the speaker presents it as such to his
audience, in the appropriate context where his audience can
be expected to recognize what is being offered.  The speaker
cannot count as having promised or asserted something if he
had no such intention, or if he did not present his utterance
to be seen as a promise or assertion, whereas the evidential
import of what he says and does is independent of such
22 After a “preamble”, Anscombe begins her essay with the statement “‘Be-
lieve’ with personal object cannot be reflexive” (op. cit., p. 144).  See also Cav-
ell (1979), p. 393: “A striking exception to the thought that I can stand in any
relation to myself that I can stand to others is that of belief.  Why apparently can
I not, in grammar, believe myself?”
conditions.
The speaker’s authority to determine the illocutionary
status of his utterance is the authority he has to present him-
self as accountable for the performance of some speech act.
This is not a matter of discovery for the speaker, something
he could investigate or report on, as he might with respect to
the evidential status of something.  When it is a question of
the evidential status of something, even something the per-
son himself has done, he and his interlocutors are on an
equal footing with respect to establishing its standing as a
reason for belief.  A person does not speak with any special
authority about the evidential significance of his actions, in-
cluding his verbal ones.  By contrast, the authority to present
oneself  as  “hereby”  assuming  certain  responsibilities  in
speech makes the speaker’s epistemic position irreducibly
different from that of his audience.  For him the import of his
words is not an independently obtaining fact, something he
has his own opinion about, but is directly dependent on the
import he is then and there prepared to invest them with.
And it is internal to the notion of the speaker’s authority to
confer illocutionary status on his utterance that he also has
the  exclusive  authority  to  cancel  or  revoke  such  status.
Words can be retracted, apologies or warnings taken back,
but only by the speaker himself.  At the same time, he has no
authority to determine, much less cancel, the evidential im-
port of anything he has said or done, not even of his retrac-
tion itself.
When all goes well in testimony, a speaker gives his
audience a reason to believe something, but unlike other
ways of influencing the beliefs of others, in this case the rea-
son the audience is provided is seen by both parties as de-
pendent on the speaker’s making himself accountable, con-
ferring a right of complaint on his audience should his claim
be false.  Whether this counts as a good or sufficient reason22
Richard Moran Getting Told and Being Believed
for  belief  is  not  a  matter  of  the  speaker’s  illocutionary
authority, but will depend both on his sincerity and on his
having discharged his epistemic responsibilities with respect
to the belief in question.
23  But his presentation of his utter-
ance as having this particular illocutionary force is what
makes it a candidate for epistemic assessment in the first
place and determines what kind of reason for just what
proposition his audience is being presented with.
This way of looking at testimony makes much of the fact
that in its central instances speech is an action addressed to
another person, and that in testimony in particular the kind
of reason for belief that is presented is one that functions in
part by binding speaker and audience together, and altering
the normative relationship between them.  It doesn’t follow
from this, however, that someone outside that normative
relationship can’t avail himself of it and thereby acquire a
reason to believe the same thing.   If one person gives his
word on something to another, whether as promise or asser-
tion, someone overhearing this may derive a sufficient rea-
son to believe, say, that the speaker will in fact do what he
promised or that what he asserted is true.   And the over-
hearer improves his epistemic situation in this way without
entering into the altered normative relationship of the two
parties involved in giving and accepting of words.  He has
not himself been told anything, much less promised any-
thing, and no right of complaint has been conferred upon
him.
24  To say this much, however, does not provide a reason
23 Cf. Williamson (1996): “To make an assertion is to confer a responsibility
(on oneself) for the truth of its content; to satisfy the rule of assertion, by having
the requisite knowledge, is to discharge that responsibility, by epistemically en-
suring the truth of the content.  Our possession of such speech acts is no more
surprising than the fact that we have a use for relations of responsibility.”
24 For further discussion of assertions and promises, emphasizing their dif-
ferences as well as similarities in their relations to the speaker’s responsibilities,
see Watson (2004).
to assimilate his situation to that of someone confronting a
piece of evidence, or to suggest that the speaker’s illocution-
ary and epistemic responsibilities aren’t playing a genuinely
epistemic role here.  For even though the statement was not
addressed to him, the overhearer is still in a different position
from that of someone confronting a piece of evidence like a
photograph or a footprint.  It still makes a difference to his
epistemic relation to the overheard report that he is re-
sponding to something whose epistemic significance is not
independent in the way of a photograph or footprint, but is
inherited from the speaker’s assuming responsibility for the
truth (and meaning) of what he says.  This is so even if, as
we might say, that responsibility was undertaken with re-
spect to another person and not himself.
Naturally there is a certain vagueness as to just what
situations will count as overhearing, and in a given case the
addressee may be a group of people.  Nonetheless, while the
overhearer may get a reason to believe without having the
right to complaint that is conferred on the addressee, the fact
that the overhearer of the assertion acquires any reason to
believe from listening to these words is dependent on their
being addressed to someone, with the force of assuming re-
sponsibility and thereby conferring a right of complaint.
The overhearer of testimony is not in the same normative
relation to the speaker as the addressee is, but his gaining
any reason to believe is dependent on such a conferral hav-
ing been given to someone.   Without that, the question of
what speech act, if any, is being performed with these words
would not be settled, and hence the overhearer could not get
started on assessing their epistemic significance.  (Imagine
overhearing someone say “The rain in Spain falls mainly on
the plain”.  Until you know what speech act, if any, is being
performed here, you don’t know if considerations of reli-
ability or trustworthiness are even relevant to the status of23
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the words as a source of knowledge about the weather in
Spain.)  So, while in both cases (promising and telling) the
overhearer can gain a reason to believe something without
entering into the normative relation of promisor-promisee or
teller-believer, in the overhearing of testimony he gains a
reason to believe something only because such a relationship
has been established by the original speaker and addressee.
This, then, is how I suggest we understand Ross’s claim
that the Evidential View is inconsistent with the kind of rea-
son for belief offered in everyday human testimony.  In tell-
ing his audience something the speaker does not present his
utterance as something with the force of evidence because
that would be to present his words as having their specific
epistemic import apart from his assurance, and the respon-
sibility he thereby assumes.  And in obscuring the speaker’s
responsibility, such a stance would also obscure the nature
of the audience’s dependence on him.  For if it were a matter
of evidence then in principle we would both be on an equal
footing with respect to establishing its epistemic import.  But
this equity does not obtain with respect to someone’s words,
where it is up to the speaker alone to determine whether
they are to count as an assertion or other committed speech
act.
Evidence and Disharmony
The two broad views about testimony which I’ve been call-
ing the Evidential View and the Assurance View are in no
disagreement over the status of an assertion or a promise as
essentially the action of a free agent.  Both views are clear
that speaking is a voluntary activity, and that the speech of
others has that kind of significance in our lives.  Where they
differ is in how that freedom is related to the status of the
utterance as a reason to believe.  For on the Assurance View,
it is not just that a particular free action is seen to have some
epistemic import, but rather that the epistemic import of
what he does is dependent on the speaker’s attitude toward
his  utterance  and  presentation  of  it  in  a  certain  spirit,
whereas by contrast, it is in the nature of genuinely eviden-
tial relations that they are not subject to anyone’s conferral
or revocation.  It might still be asked, however, whether it
doesn’t still all come down to evidential relations in the end.
The  following  reconstruction  may  be  offered.   Yes,  the
speaker freely assumes responsibility for the truth of what
he asserts.  But now this very act of assurance is a fact, which
the  audience  confronts  as  evidence  (of  some  degree  of
strength) for the truth of what has been asserted.  Speech is
acknowledged to be importantly different from other (indi-
catively) expressive behavior, but the audience’s relation to
it, as a reason to believe something, can only be evidential.
The claim of the Assurance View, however, is not that an
assertion could not be treated purely as evidence.  It is al-
ways possible to treat anything a person says or does as con-
stituting further evidence for one thing or another, and there
is no level at which this somehow becomes impossible.  The
point instead is that refusing to acknowledge any epistemic
stance toward the speaker’s words other than as evidence
means that speaker and audience must always be in dishar-
mony with each other, for in the contexts of telling, promis-
ing, and apologizing the speaker is not presenting his utter-
ance as evidence.  And it is internal to the speech acts of, e.g.,
telling or thanking that they are not presented as evidence
for one’s belief or gratitude.  To present one’s utterance as
evidence  would  be  to  do  something  other  than  to  tell,
promise, or apologize.
This claim may seem paradoxical.   On the Assurance
View, the making of an assertion can be treated as evidence,
can properly be evidence for various things, but the practice
cannot coherently be described as the offering of evidence.24
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But how could this be?  If the speaker recognizes that his as-
serting can be, or even just is, evidence for the truth of the
very proposition asserted, then how could there be anything
amiss with his presenting it as something (viz., evidence)
that he sees it legitimately is?  But this general possibility for
self-defeat should not be surprising.   To allay the sense of
paradox here, compare the assurance given in a promise with
that of an assertion, and consider the incoherence or self-
defeat in saying something like ‘I promise; but of course I
might change my mind, or forget, or cease caring’.  Here as
well, the speaker is only saying something that both parties
know to be true, about himself and about promises in gen-
eral.  But to say so is, at the very least, contrary to the spirit
in which a promise is made, contrary to the very point of
making a promise.  And what makes for this self-defeat is
precisely the presentation of it in an evidential spirit.   For
notice:   for someone to say ‘I promise, but I might change
my mind’ is to refer to his promise as a fallible indication of
future performance.  That is, it is to present it as a kind of de-
feasible evidence for what he will do.  And, of course, inso-
far as a promise is seen as evidence at all it can only be seen
as defeasible evidence.   Hence for the speaker to offer his
promise as evidence means he must be offering it as, at best,
defeasible evidence, with respect to which the promissee is
on his own.  And to do so is contrary to the point of making
a promise, which is assurance.
The disharmony between speaker and audience entailed
by the Evidential View comes out in the consideration of two
possible  responses  to  receiving  a  promise.   If  someone
promises to mail a letter for me, one thing I might do is ac-
cept his promise, placing myself in his hands and taking my-
self to now have sufficient reason for believing that he will
mail the letter.  If it turns out he doesn’t mail the letter, either
through carelessness or because he never really intended to,
then I will feel aggrieved and let down.  This is the ordinary
expectation and liability to disappointment.  I might, how-
ever, opt for another kind of response altogether.   Here I
don’t accept the promise; I simply don’t go in for that sort of
thing, as I may not accept promises from a small child or (for
different reasons) from someone I despise, but in another
way I do take seriously the fact that he made one to me.  In
this spirit I may reason:  “He is unlikely to make a promise
he won’t fulfill, since that would discredit him as a future
promisor, and there are great and obvious advantages in
remaining someone whose promises are accepted.   There-
fore, the fact that he made this promise to me makes it prob-
able that he will in fact mail the letter.  So I believe he will.”
If, on this second scenario, I later discover that he did not
mail the letter after all, my reaction will be different.  I will
be disappointed, of course, and I will be surprised that he
would discredit himself in this way.  But I can’t confront him
with my complaint or my resentment because I never ac-
cepted the promise in the first place.  My relation to this per-
son’s promise is similar to my relation to the person I sus-
pect of “double-bluffing” me.  I don’t believe him; there’s no
question of that.   But nonetheless his statement that he’s
traveling to Minsk functions as my reason for believing that
this is what he will do.  In both cases the speaker has made
me a free declaration which I then make evidential use of to
infer to the truth of what he says.  On the Evidential View,
this second type of response to promises and assertions
would have to be the only epistemically legitimate one, and
yet such a reconstruction would yield an incoherent de-
scription of the practices of telling or promising.  It would be
incoherent because on such a view the speaker would have
to be in the position of offering assurances that are never ac-
cepted, and which he knows are never accepted, and the
audience would nonetheless be relying on the continued of-25
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fering of such free assurances to serve as his evidential base.
The issue of harmony between speaker and audience
goes deeper than this, however, and helps to delineate the
relationship between the speaker’s authority to determine
the illocutionary status of his utterance and its actual epis-
temic import.  In asserting that P, where the context is one of
telling, the speaker is not in a position to constitute his utter-
ance as a good or sufficient reason for P, since that will de-
pend on his credentials and success as a knower, as well as
his honesty.  But in the act of telling his audience that P, he
does claim definitive “say” in determining that his utterance
is being presented as a reason for belief rather than, say, as a
speculation or grammatical example, as well as determining
just what it is that he is giving his word on.   From the
speaker’s  perspective  both  determinations  matter  to  the
alignment of speaker and audience that he sees himself as
aiming at.  From a purely evidential perspective, however, it
shouldn’t matter to the audience whether the route from the
speaker’s words to a true belief involves the loop in double-
bluffing or not.   And just as clearly in such a case there
would be failure of correspondence between the spirit in
which the statement is made and that in which it is received.
The speaker who asserts P is not indifferent to whether he
induces belief in his audience through the loop of double-
bluffing.  His assertion is asking for belief in the very propo-
sition stated and for the very sort of reason that he is then
and there presenting.  And that sort of reason is bound up
with his presenting himself as accountable for this truth.  In
double-bluffing, the reason for belief taken by the audience
is different from the reason the speaker offers.  What telling
aims at, by contrast, is that there be a correspondence or
identity between the reason the speaker takes himself to be
offering and what the audience accepts as a reason.  So we
might say, in telling his audience that P, the speaker asks
that his authority be acknowledged to determine what sort
of candidate reason for what belief is up for consideration.
This is the spirit in which his statement is made, and it is this
that is denied by treating his utterance in a wholly evidential
spirit, in which the question of what is being considered a
reason for what is anybody’s business, and is not tethered to
the speaker’s awareness or intent.   Conversation may of
course move into and out of this dimension of assessment,
but for purposes of either agreement or disagreement it can-
not begin there.
In the speech-act of telling, the speaker commits himself
to his audience with respect to a particular proposition, and
with respect to the kind of reason being presented.   This
follows from the difference between doing something that
has a certain epistemic significance (as with taking or show-
ing a photograph) and being responsible for something’s
having  the  epistemic  significance  that  it  has  (as  with  a
speaker and his words).  In telling his audience something,
the speaker aims at being believed, an aim which is manifest
to both parties and which binds the speaker and audience
together with respect to a norm of correspondence between
the reason offered and the reason accepted.  When an act of
telling completes itself, speaker and audience are aligned in
this way through their mutual recognition of the speaker’s
role in determining the kind of reason for belief that is up for
acceptance, so that when the speaker is believed there is a
non-accidental relation between the reason presented and
the reason accepted.  The speaker says, in effect, “The kind
of reason for belief you gain from my statement is precisely
the kind of reason for belief I am hereby presenting myself
as offering you.  Insofar as there is a disparity between the
two, I disavow responsibility for whatever belief you may
derive from my assertion.”   Presenting his utterance that26
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way is a kind of declaration of transparency to his audience:
the kind of reason overtly presented is precisely the reason
that is meant to count for you.  When the background of the
speaker’s knowledge and sincerity can be assumed, and the
speaker  is  in  fact  believed  by  his  audience  (a  common
enough occurrence, after all), the two parties are in sync
with each other in a way that they would not be if the audi-
ence were to take the utterance either as a reason for some
other belief rather than the one stated, or a different kind of
reason for that belief (as with double-bluffing).  Taking the
utterance as evidence detaches the reason-giving signifi-
cance of the utterance from the speaker’s authority to deter-
mine what he is thereby committing himself to.
25   From an
evidential perspective it may function as evidence for any
number of things, for which the speaker’s competence or re-
sponsibility may be irrelevant.   This is manifestly not the
speaker’s perspective on the epistemic significance of his
statement, which he sees in terms of the nexus of a specific
responsibility  assumed  and  a  specific  entitlement  con-
25 That the directness of the audience’s dependence on the person of the
speaker as such is related to the directness of the speaker’s own relation to the
reasons on which he bases his belief is something I have been helped to see by
Adam Leite’s paper “On Justifying and Being Justified” (2004).   Because the
speaker’s statement of his reasons is not a hypothesis he makes about the origin
of his belief, his assertion makes him (and not, e.g., something inside him) di-
rectly accountable for the truth or believability of his claim.   Leite puts it the
following way (pp. 227 - 228): “Suppose that you consider reasons for and
against a claim, find that certain reasons decisively support holding it, and sin-
cerely declare that you believe the claim for those reasons.  In the usual case,
you thereby directly determine what the reasons are for which you hold the be-
lief.  Moreover, in declaring your reasons you both open yourself to epistemic
evaluation or criticism on account of those reasons’ inadequacy and incur cer-
tain obligations—in particular, an obligation either to give up the belief or to
seek better reasons, should those reasons prove inadequate.   A minimal ade-
quacy condition for an account of the epistemic basing relation is thus that it al-
low (1) that the reasons for which a belief is held can be directly determined in
this way, and (2) that one sometimes directly opens oneself to epistemic criti-
cism and incurs further justificatory responsibilities by sincerely declaring that
one holds one’s belief for particular reasons.”
ferred.
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For the act of telling to complete itself there must be a
correspondence between the reason being presented by the
speaker and the reason accepted by his audience.  This is the
nexus that is aimed at in the self-reflexive aspect of the
Gricean formula, wherein the speaker asks that the very rea-
son he is thereby presenting be the reason that the audience
thereby accepts (i.e., through recognizing that very inten-
tion).   Telling aims at being believed, which proceeds, via
the speaker’s overt assumption of responsibility, by joining
together the particular belief proposed for acceptance, the
kind of reason being presented for it, and the reason ac-
cepted by the audience.  An evidential stance, by contrast,
de-couples all of these from each other, to be re-assembled as
the observer thinks best.  But such a stance is contrary to the
speaker’s perspective on his action, insofar as it pictures his
presentation of himself as meaning, in effect, that as far as
reason-giving force goes, the audience is on his own; as if the
meaning of his utterance were “Now I have spoken; make of
it what you will” rather than “Take it from me”.
More is conveyed in our ordinary assertions than the
specific proposition asserted, and more is often intended to be
conveyed by the speaker, and much of this will be picked up
in an evidential spirit.  All of which is to say that not all, not
nearly  all,  speech  takes  the  form  of  one  person  telling
something to another, testifying to its truth.  Not everything
26 Putting it this way describes the relationship of speaker and audience in
terms of an essentially correlative or “bi-polar” normativity, of the sort that has
recently been explored by a number of philosophers.   By contrast, the non-
personal nature of evidence, the independence of its epistemic force from its
being presented as a reason to another person, expresses the “monadic” charac-
ter of its normativity.  It was only at a late stage of working on this paper that I
began to see the direct relevance to these issues concerning testimony of the
work on “correlativity”, “bi-polar normativity”, and private law by Ernest Wein-
rib (1995), Martin Stone (1996 and 2001), and Michael Thompson (2004); as
well as Stephen Darwall’s forthcoming work on the second-person standpoint,
all of which will repay further study in thinking about speech and testimony.27
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we need to convey is best conveyed by being told to another,
in part because not everything we need to communicate is
something we could sensibly ask to be relied on for, present
ourselves as accountable for, or ask to be accepted on our
say-so (e.g., the occasional comedy or tragedy in someone’s
asserting his own dignity or probity).  Nonetheless, it is clear
enough what Anscombe means when she speaks of the in-
sult and injury in not being believed.
27  And the offence re-
mains even when the speaker’s audience takes his having
made the statement to count as evidence for its truth, just as
above he may take the speaker’s having made the promise to
make it more probable that he will do the thing in question.
The offence lies in his refusing to accept what the speaker
freely and explicitly offers him, in favor of privately attend-
ing to what the speaker’s action passively reveals, just as
someone might refuse an apology while still taking it in this
case to be a reliable indication of remorse.   What makes
sense of such refusals is the fact that acceptance of an asser-
tion or an apology doesn’t just put one in a different epis-
temic position with respect to the facts but brings with it
certain vulnerabilities and responsibilities of its own.   Ac-
cepting an apology, for instance, brings with it the responsi-
bility to put away one’s resentment, and makes one vulner-
able to a particularly bruising possibility of deceit.   These
risks are avoided by simply taking the apology as more or
less good evidence for remorse, and then making of it what
one will.
The Evidential View puts speaker and audience into dis-
harmony with each other in mislocating the connection be-
tween what the speaker does and the fact that it provides a
reason for belief.  From the speaker’s point of view it is not a
matter of what his behavior passively indicates, but a matter
of what he then and there presents himself as assuming re-
27 Anscombe, p. 150.  See also Austin, p. 100.
sponsibility for.  Unlike an evidential relation, the connec-
tion between the speaker’s words and what he asserts or
what he promises is entirely at his disposal to declare or to
retract.   The possibility of such retraction is central to the
meaning of speech acts of assertion, promising, and the like,
and shows how different they are in meaning and conse-
quence  from  other  actions.   The  speaker  alone  has  the
authority to bestow such epistemic import on his words, or
to cancel it; whereas he speaks with no such authority over
the evidential import of anything he does or says.
Speaking of course is an action; something with conse-
quences in the world like other actions, and which leaves
behind evidence of itself.  But the exclusivity of the speaker’s
authority shows that retracting one’s words is not to be con-
fused with undoing the consequences of an action that went
wrong.   Often enough, another person could in principle
clean up after the mess I made as well as I.  But no one else
can take back what I said.  And, of course, taking back what
I said does not make it as if it never happened.  After I’ve
taken back what I said it may still take a long time for me to
undo  the  damage  my  hard  or  thoughtless  words  have
caused.  But that doesn’t mean that taking them back doesn’t
accomplish anything, that I might just as well not have re-
turned to them.  There’s still an important difference in the
situations before and after the angry words are retracted.
Indeed, taking them back was a prior condition for the more
practical (or consequential) work of starting to try to undo
the damage they caused.  And that’s a different kind of task.
I cannot “hereby”  undo  the  damage,  the  hurt  feelings  I
caused; that takes consequential work, which may fail in un-
foreseen ways, like any other action.  But again, that doesn’t
mean that the sort of thing I can accomplish “hereby” is
something I perform magically or effortlessly, or that it may
not be something I can only manage with great difficulty.  It28
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will, however, be a different kind of difficulty from that in-
volved in repairing the actual damage.  If I try and fail here,
at the level of retraction or apology, it will not be for reasons
of unforeseeable accidents, or the general resistance of the
world to our wills.
28
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